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Identify a problem and determine a solution. When a new invention hits 
the market, innovators race to be the first to fill a unique niche in that market or 
to find a way to enhance the way the user experiences that new invention. This 
race has long benefitted the public by providing alternatives and upgrades at a 
relatively fast pace.1 Intellectual property (IP) law is designed to reward 
inventors and artists with certain rights to control their works, but at the same 
time it limits those rights so others can use copyrighted works and the 
knowledge associated with them as a springboard to further innovation.2 
In the past, IP has always manifested itself in tangible goods.3 However, 
the development of the Internet has led to the proliferation of intangible, digital 
services and media,4 exposing the content creators to new threats of attack, like 
piracy, which can occur at lightning speed.5 In response to this new threat of 
online piracy, Congress quickly passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) in 1998 to prohibit the circumvention of access controls to online 
content.6 Access controls use various technological means to prevent 
unauthorized users from accessing a particular work.7 Examples of access 
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controls include password screens8 and encryption software,9 which prevent 
unauthorized downloading. However, Congress did not consider how this 
legislation would be used by copyright holders to extend copyright protection to 
ideas and information not traditionally protected under copyright law.10 
To combat this unintended extension of copyright protection, some courts 
have adopted the infringement nexus standard, which requires that a plaintiff 
show that the defendant not only circumvented access controls, but that the 
defendant then engaged in some form of illicit copying.11 The infringement 
nexus standard provides strong protection against the abuse of the DMCA’s 
anti-circumvention provisions;12 but, in recent software cases involving licensing 
and intangible goods, courts have been willing to abandon the nexus 
requirement. Software infringement often involves third-party developers who 
write software programs that are improvements or additions to software already 
on the market. By developing unauthorized improvements, third-party 
developers open themselves up to liability as contributory infringers.13 In order 
to find a third-party developer liable for contributory infringement, courts find 
themselves in the awkward position of first finding customers liable for direct 
infringement—an absurd finding that comes with high statutory damages against 
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a group that is mostly judgment-proof.14 Consequently, courts are more willing 
to recognize a copyright holder’s nearly absolute right to access controls.15 
Courts seem to have good intentions in avoiding that absurd result by 
abandoning the nexus, but this abandonment has led to a very powerful right that 
can easily be abused by the copyright holder.16 This Note argues that, in cases 
where copyright plaintiffs are using anti-circumvention provisions to keep 
competitors out of emerging software aftermarkets, courts must adopt a 
palatable standard of copyright misuse to allow defendants a valid defense. 
In Part I, this Note discusses the principles of copyright, the evolution of 
the affirmative defense of copyright misuse, the basics of the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions, and the problems that result when these provisions 
are upheld without a nexus requirement. Part II recommends that courts adopt a 
narrowed version of copyright so that case law precedent can be established that 
fairly balances the rights of both second-comer innovators and copyright 
holders. Finally, Part III addresses the consequences of narrowing the defense 
and whether doing so will ultimately reduce its effectiveness as a deterrent 
against overexpansion of monopoly rights by copyright holders. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Constitution gives Congress the power to grant authors a limited 
monopoly on the expression of their ideas through copyright with the intent of 
furthering the progress of the arts and science.17 Pursuant to the Copyright 
Clause, United States copyright law seeks to balances the rights of copyright 
holders to control their works with the desire to allow the public to access and 
use those works to further innovation.18 The purpose is to grant enough incentive 
for “writers” to create new works to add to the body of knowledge that will 
ultimately benefit the public. Without this incentive, many individuals would be 
unable to invest their time and resources into creating new works.19 As part of 
this limited monopoly, copyright holders are granted a bundle of rights that 
include reproduction rights, distribution rights, public display rights, public 
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performance rights, and rights in the control and development of derivative 
works.20 
Once creators receive a copyright, they are guaranteed protection from 
others who would infringe upon their rights through various forms of copying.21 
Infringement occurs when an individual makes an unauthorized reproduction, 
distribution, display, public performance, or derivative work.22 Direct 
infringement occurs when an individual engages in one of these unauthorized 
forms of copying.23 Additionally, when an individual induces or makes it 
possible for others to infringe a copyright, they may be liable for contributory 
infringement.24 
A. Technological Circumvention of Copyrighted Works 
Technological advances have presented new challenges for courts and 
copyright holders. This section will consider these new challenges brought on by 
increased consumer demand for digital content and consider the reasons for 
introducing access controls. 
Prior to the internet and the subsequent distribution of digital copies, it 
was very cumbersome to produce high-quality copies of books and music. While 
consumers have had access to copy machines and portable music players with 
copying capabilities,25 consumers only received high-quality hard-copy versions 
by purchasing them from a store. Infringement of high-quality hard copies was 
less of a problem because it took a much longer time to create and distribute the 
product. Therefore, when an attempt to produce a high-quality hard-copy was 
made, copyright holders had more time to respond before losing control of their 
works. Now, however, pirates can produce and distribute digital copies across 
the internet almost instantaneously.26 
The media-consuming public has become more sophisticated and 
increasingly prefers content in digital format.27 A recent report by Deloitte states 
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that thirty-three percent of Americans would prefer to access content on their 
smart phones or tablets and that forty-two percent of households own at least 
one device.28 As a result, creators feel an ever-increasing pressure to provide 
content in digital formats. 
Digital formats provide a wealth of benefits to users and publishers:29 
digital content is easier to deliver, less costly to produce, and can be customized 
by the individual user.30 However, this format also exposes copyright holders to 
greater risk of illicit copying by others. Copies are much easier to reproduce and 
there is no discernible loss of quality.31 
In order to protect the interests of copyright holders, media industries 
needed a new technological means for controlling their content so as to 
distinguish between pirates and legitimate customers.32 Various password 
protections, encryptions, and handshake technologies were introduced to ensure 
that only legitimate users are allowed access to their works. As new methods 
were introduced for controlling access to works, pirates and “hackers” worked 
diligently to overcome or circumvent these access restrictions, leading to an 
“arms race” in technology.33 The threat of digital piracy across the globe 
captured the attention of the international community, and ultimately Congress, 
as it sought to work with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
to pass a treaty intended to protect United States copyright holders from 
international piracy.34 
B. The Legal Prohibition Against Circumvention 
The rise in international piracy of digital works prompted Congress to 
pass the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998. Courts have 
struggled to remain faithful to Congress’ intent, which has resulted in the 
adoption of several different standards of analysis. Initially, courts required a 
“nexus” between the circumvention of access controls and copyright 
violations.35 However, courts have made an artificial distinction between cases 
involving hardware and software.36 This section discusses the anti-
circumvention provisions set forth in the DMCA, and the resulting expansion of 
control copyright holders have over their digital content. Next, the approaches 
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taken by courts when faced with this expansion of rights are examined followed 
by a discussion of the problems associated with the differing standards. Finally, 
this section examines the affirmative defense of copyright misuse used to fight 
overreaching plaintiffs. 
1. DMCA Prohibitions Against Circumvention 
The DMCA was enacted to bring the United States into compliance with 
international WIPO treaties that address the problem of online piracy.37 At the 
time of passage, copyright industries comprised six percent of the nation’s 
GDP.38 Additionally, approximately $18 to $20 billion dollars per year were lost 
to international piracy.39 
The prime motivation for passing the anti-circumvention provisions was 
to harmonize the efforts of the United States with those of the international 
community to prevent piracy of digital intellectual property. Three core 
provisions of the DMCA were adopted as anti-circumvention measures:40 (1) a 
bar on circumventing access controls,41 (2) a prohibition on trafficking of 
devices and other technologies designed to circumvent access controls,42 and (3) 
a prohibition on the trafficking of devices and other technologies designed to 
circumvent rights controls.43 Essentially, the prime motivation for passing the 
anti-circumvention provisions in 1201(a) and (b) was to have leverage with the 
international community to prevent piracy of digital intellectual property.44 
Access controls prevent people from accessing a digital format, regardless 
of whether the content is protected by copyright or not.45 The DMCA provisions 
cited above were intended to prohibit people from circumventing the technical 
protection measures (TPMs) put into place by copyright holders. Many were 
alarmed that these provisions would provide a strong “right of access” to the 
copyright holder while seriously restricting the public domain.46 Another 
  
 37 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Mitchell, supra note 7, at 7. 
 41 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2012); Mitchell, supra note 7, at 7. 
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 45 Mitchell, supra note 7, at 7. 
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concern was the effect on fair use because the DMCA provisions are silent as to 
traditional copyright limitations.47 
2. Courts’ Treatment of DMCA Violations 
As a way to guard against a broadening of access rights, courts 
traditionally required both an access violation and a violation of a copyright 
granted under § 106.48 To prove infringement, the circumvention of TMP had to 
result in the infringement of one of the default rights listed in § 106.49 By 
interpreting the DMCA to require a “nexus” of violations, courts placed 
limitations on the anti-circumvention provisions by refusing to grant a broad 
“right of access” to the copyright holder, which would have given the copyright 
holder an absolute right to control access to digital content.50 Instead, to prove 
infringement, the circumvention of TMP had to result in the infringement of one 
of the default rights listed in § 106. Without a violation of one of these default 
rights, courts were unwilling to find infringement based on access 
circumvention.51 
For example, in Chamberlain v. Skylink Tech.,52 the Federal Circuit was 
presented with the question of whether creating a universal remote for garage 
door openers violated the copyright on the software that Chamberlain created to 
control its garage door openers.53 Chamberlain added software to its openers to 
prevent a theoretical security issue in which a burglar could hide and copy the 
signal transmitted from the Chamberlain remote to the opener.54 The software 
randomly created a new signal each time, making it impossible to copy.55 While 
there were no incidents of burglars ever engaging in this type of break-in, the 
scrambled signal did make it much harder for aftermarket competitors to create 
compatible remotes.56 
In order to create the universal remote, Skylink had to bypass the garage 
door opener’s access controls so that it could reverse engineer the software and 
  
 47 Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use and Digital Rights Management: Preliminary 
Thoughts on the (Irreconcilable?) Tension Between Them, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION, available at http://w2.eff.org/IP/DRM/fair_use_and_drm.html (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2013) (concluding that Congress has failed to provide limiting principles for 
DRM that will ultimately erode the public’s right to fair use). 
 48 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (including reproduction, distribution, display, and 
derivative works rights). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 
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 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 1183–85. 
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create its universal remote.57 The court ultimately found that because customers 
purchased the garage door system, including the software, they were the new 
copyright holders and that purchasing the universal remote constituted their 
consent to allow Skylink to copy the software.58 Notably, the court reasoned that 
if it held otherwise, anyone would be able to add a few lines of copyright notice 
to code and effectively bar competitors from being able to enter into a hardware 
aftermarket.59 By requiring a “nexus” between access violations and 
infringement, the court found that even though Skylink circumvented 
Chamberlain’s access controls, Skylink did not engage in illicit copying.60 Thus, 
the court was able to limit the rights granted by the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA and prevent them from being misused to prevent 
competition. 
Courts have required an infringement nexus for hardware devices that run 
software because they can recognize that an abuse of access rights would 
prevent legitimate competition within hardware aftermarkets.61 However, 
Christopher Soghoian has noted that there is a disconnect in the way courts 
interpret the laws governing software aftermarkets.62 Most notably, in MDY v. 
Blizzard Entertainment, the Ninth Circuit abandoned the nexus requirement and 
recognized Blizzard’s access rights to its game, World of Warcraft, without 
finding that MDY had violated any of Blizzard’s § 106 rights.63 
In MDY, a World of Warcraft player named Michael Donnelly became 
frustrated with the amount of time required to “level up” alternate characters. 
Donnelly decided to create “Glider,” a program, or “bot,” that automatically 
played the character for the Warcraft subscriber, thereby freeing up the 
subscriber to work on other things.64 Realizing its utility, Donnelly formed a 
company, MDY Industries, and made the bot available to other players for a 
subscription fee.65 When Blizzard Entertainment became aware of the bot, it 
created its own detection software to restrict access to the server by preventing 
users from logging on if the bot was found running on the users’ systems.66 This 
TPM would also run periodically throughout the game session to ensure that the 
player had not begun using the bot after successfully logging on to the Blizzard 
server.67 
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In response, Donnelly continued to tweak his bot each time Blizzard 
modified its access controls, thereby resulting in competition between the parties 
to control Blizzard’s customers’ behavior.68 Unlike the customers in 
Chamberlain, however, Warcraft players did not own the multiplayer world they 
were entering; they merely purchased a license to access this environment. 
Therefore, Blizzard wanted to classify its customers’ behavior as copyright 
infringement, not to punish its customer base (which would be absurd),69 but to 
enable them to pursue MDY as a secondary infringer.70 
The court seemed reluctant to classify customers as infringers,71 possibly 
because it realized that it would open the door for large companies to seek large 
statutory damages from its customers. Instead, the court made a formalistic 
distinction between covenants and conditions within a contract in order to find 
that Blizzard’s customers had not infringed its copyright.72 However, the court 
made a surprising move when it found that the circumvention of Blizzard’s 
access controls was wrongful, even though MDY had not illicitly copied.73 By 
abandoning the nexus requirement, the Ninth Circuit recognized a new “right of 
access,” bringing Dan Burk’s fears to life—namely that large content providers 
would grow so powerful that they could engage in anti-competitive behaviors 
and dominate their own aftermarkets.74 
C. Problems with Abandoning the Nexus Requirement 
Blizzard Entertainment is not the only large content provider that has 
attempted to stifle second-generation development. Other large content 
providers have also faced similar challenges from second-generation developers. 
In these cases, courts have found in favor of a copyright holder’s independent 
right to control access and have largely avoided performing a misuse analysis.75 
For example, in Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc.,76 the Northern District of 
California found in favor of Craigslist and enjoined Powerpostings.com from 
  
 68 Id. 
 69 Soghoian, supra note 15, at 92. 
 70 MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939–40. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. (The court held that customers had violated copyright license terms. Since those 
terms do not limit the license’s scope, the court held that these were “covenants” and that 
Blizzard could only act on the breach by bringing an action under contract law, not 
copyright infringement.). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Burk, supra note 10, at 1135–36. 
 75 MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941; see also Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. 
GameMasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also Apple, Inc. v. Psystar 
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931, 940 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 76 See generally Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010). 
 




licensing its auto-posting software.77 Powerpostings.com had overcome the 
CAPTCHA encryption78 embedded on the Craigslist listing pages. This holding 
still stands despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit recently found that the content 
on the Craigslist site is not copyrightable.79 Further, in Facebook, Inc. v. Power 
Ventures, Inc., the Northern District of California again found in favor of the 
copyright holder, holding that Power Ventures could not create a third-party 
application that allowed users to voluntarily provide their Facebook logins and 
passwords in order to scrape80 the user’s own content81—content that Facebook 
states users own and to which it claims no copyright.82 
Additionally, when courts hold in favor of a copyright holder’s rights of 
access, the controversies do not end there. As a result of such holdings, some 
software companies have relocated to countries with more favorable copyright 
laws. In MDY, the court found for Blizzard and assessed damages at $6.5 
million, enough to put MDY permanently out of business.83 Yet, defeating this 
second-generation developer did not end the controversy. Instead, a new 
company, HonorBuddy, was formed in Germany.84 HonorBuddy programs and 
sells licenses to second-generation bots that essentially perform the same 
function as the “Glider” bot built by MDY.85 Further, although the Craigslist 
court enjoined Powerposter.com from licensing its bots, other software 
developers continue to provide these services from other countries.86 
  
 77 Powerpostings.com wrote a program that would automatically create multiple 
advertisements on Craigslist, going against the Craigslist end license user agreement 
which requires users to manually post ads. See id. at 1049. The manual posting 
requirement was to ensure that spammers would not flood the site with frivolous ads, but 
did not address the business needs of larger distributors capable of distributing products 
nationwide. 
 78 CAPTCHA stands for “Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers 
and Humans apart. Id. at 1048. This field requires a user to manually type the letters that 
appear in an image, a task that is difficult for bots to overcome. See id. 
 79 Derek Khanna, Craigslist’s Allegations Of “Copyright” Violations Thrown Out, 
FORBES (Apr. 30, 2013, 7:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/derekkhanna/ 
2013/04/30/craigslists-allegations-of-copyright-violations-thrown-out/. 
 80 “Scrape” is a word that programmers use when they write a program that 
automatically grabs information from one web page and inserts it into a database for 
display or use on another web page. 
 81 See generally Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1031 
(N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 82 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
 83 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 958 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 84 HONORBUDDY, http://www.honorbuddy.com/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
 85 HONORBUDDY, https://bosslandgmbh.zendesk.com/attachments/token/niva0ozwn0 
ml0ag/?name=HonorBuddy+User+Manual+[EN].pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
 86 For example, Clad Genius is a popular provider located out of Hong-Kong. CLAD 
GENIUS, http://www.cladg.com/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
 





If courts are going to abandon the nexus requirement, it is imperative that 
they find a way to give defendants a reasonable defense. This reasonable 
defense should support the rights of second-generation developers to participate 
in a robust software aftermarket and also honor the spirit of the DMCA. 
Moreover, given the above-mentioned ramifications, courts should reconsider 
their reluctance to perform a misuse analysis. By performing this analysis, 
courts can more readily separate defendants who illicitly copy from those simply 
attempting to compete in the software aftermarket. 
D. The Defense of Copyright Misuse and Its Shortcomings 
Copyright misuse is based on the contractual doctrine of unclean hands,87 
which denies equitable relief to a plaintiff who has also engaged in unfair 
behaviors.88 Traditionally, defendants claim a plaintiff has unclean hands and 
attempt to show that the relief sought by the plaintiff was “illegal, fraudulent, or 
unfair”89 because the plaintiff had also engaged in some type of wrongful 
conduct.90 Upon a finding of unclean hands, courts could refuse to reward a 
plaintiff’s wrongful conduct by denying equitable.91 
In order to invoke a defense of copyright misuse, a defendant must show 
that (1) a plaintiff violated antitrust laws, (2) a plaintiff attempted to extend its 
copyright over content or material not traditionally protected by copyright, or (3) 
the enforcement of the copyright goes against public policy for granting a 
copyright.92 A finding of misuse will also render a plaintiff’s copyright 
completely unenforceable.93 This unique doctrine has evolved over the past 
thirty years, and courts have only considered it when the defendant has engaged 
in copyright infringement. 
When a court considers misuse, it generally looks only for a relationship 
between the relief requested by the plaintiff and any attempt by the plaintiff to 
improperly expand the scope of its copyright.94 Whether the defendant has been 
harmed by the plaintiff’s improper enforcement of its copyright does not factor 
into the analysis. Some have suggested that if copyright misuse were a formal 
cause of action, the plaintiff claiming misuse would have to show injury-in-fact 
stemming from the offensive use of copyright.95 However, since copyright 
  
 87 See James B. Kobak Jr., A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse for Intellectual Property 
Cases, 2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 3 (2013); see also Burk, supra note 10, at 1114–15. 
 88 Kobak, supra note 87, at 10–11. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Burk, supra note 10, at 1124. 
 93 Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Meg Dolan, Misusing Misuse: Why Copyright Misuse is Unnecessary, 17 DEPAUL-
LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 207, 236–37 (2007). 
 




misuse is an affirmative defense, the defendant is not required to show injury-in-
fact. Moreover, if a court finds that one defendant has successfully asserted a 
copyright misuse defense, then any subsequent infringer can succeed by 
asserting this defense. As a practical matter, a finding that a plaintiff has 
engaged in copyright misuse renders its copyright completely unenforceable, 
though it does not invalidate the copyright itself.96 
The first modern recognition of copyright misuse was in Lasercomb v. 
Reynolds.97 The Fourth Circuit made a landmark decision that rendered all 
claims of copyright infringement unenforceable if a company entered into any 
license agreement that was construed as misuse, regardless of whether or not the 
infringer was affected by the license.98 In Lasercomb, the plaintiff wrote a piece 
of die-cutting software called Interact and informally licensed it to Holiday Steel 
who proceeded to make unauthorized copies and tried to resell the product as its 
own.99 Even though Holiday never entered into a formal license agreement with 
Lasercomb, Holiday claimed copyright misuse because Lasercomb’s standard 
license prohibited development of similar software.100 The court found that there 
was an implied license and that because the standard agreement amounted to 
copyright misuse, the copyright was unenforceable for the entire period of the 
misuse.101This finding is unusual because it appears that a defendant who 
normally would not have had standing to sue the plaintiff was able to assert a 
defense against the plaintiff’s actions that had not caused the defendant injury.102 
After Lasercomb, courts have been hesitant to allow this affirmative 
defense, even though they are willing to recognize the important policy 
considerations behind the doctrine.103 Courts are not unjustified in their 
reluctance to apply copyright misuse within this context. A finding of copyright 
misuse imposes a severe penalty on the plaintiff as it prevents copyright holders 
from enforcing their copyrights until misuse has been cured.104 This has a 
significant impact on large companies because it renders many clear instances of 
infringement unactionable, opening a huge window for piracy and other bad 
conduct. 
When used improperly, the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA 
acts as a sword to discourage competition instead rather than as a shield to 
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protect against piracy.105 Courts have a responsibility to protect the rights 
granted to large content providers, but they also have an equal responsibility to 
make sure that protection is not used inappropriately. Acknowledging the 
viability of a misuse defense without actually engaging in the factual analysis 
does little to protect legitimate second-generation developers. 
One scholar describes two categories of copyright misuse,106 both of 
which occur when large content providers improperly restrict second-generation 
development through the use of access controls. The first category of misuse107 
occurs when copyright holders assert their rights in order to prevent others from 
participating in the market, which violates antitrust laws.108 The second category 
occurs when a copyright holder attempts to extend its copyright beyond the 
scope of the rights granted by Congress.109 In cases involving the software 
aftermarket, both categories of misuse work in concert to prevent the second-
generation developer from competing in the market. All a copyright holder has 
to do is place its content behind an access control as defined in the DMCA. If 
the content would otherwise not be protected by copyright, then the copyright 
holder has essentially used its “right of access” to prevent others from 
developing additions that would otherwise have been permissible but for the 
implementation of an access control. Accused second-generation developers 
must be afforded an affirmative defense to protect themselves from copyright 
misuse so as to prevent them from being unfairly shut out of the software 
aftermarket. 
II. MODIFIED COPYRIGHT MISUSE AS A SOLUTION 
A narrowed approach to copyright misuse would ease the courts’ 
reluctance to impose stiff penalties on plaintiffs, as well as satisfy the 
defendants’ need for an affirmative defense. First, this Part advocates that courts 
should require defendants to show actual injury before allowing them to assert 
the affirmative defense of copyright misuse. Next, this Part argues that courts 
should sever from an agreement any terms or practices that constitute misuse. 
Finally, this Part asserts that a narrow approach to copyright misuse would 
remove unfair impediments to competition, improve efficiency of litigation, and 
rebalance power between large content providers and new developers entering 
an emerging software after-market. 
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A. Discussion of Tailored Version of Copyright Misuse 
Courts should require defendants to show evidence of a harm resulting 
from a specific contract provision or actual act of alleged copyright misuse on 
the part of the plaintiff. One critic of the copyright misuse doctrine, Meg Dolan, 
has rightfully argued that under the current copyright misuse doctrine, a 
copyright pirate can claim the affirmative defense without showing that it has 
been harmed by the overreaching term or practice.110 Dolan calls this 
“representative standing” and claims that it falls short of the standing 
requirements imposed by article III of the Constitution111 because an infringer 
would not have to show injury-in-fact from the alleged copyright misuse in 
order to allege that the copyright holder has engaged in misuse.112 It is difficult 
to imagine a court affording this kind of defense to a wrongdoer because it may 
serve to encourage infringers to find fault with an otherwise proper copyright. 
The stiff penalty imposed on the plaintiff for misuse seems overly harsh in 
instances where the defendant has not been harmed and would otherwise be 
found to have illicitly copied protected content. 
By requiring the defendant to show that it has actually been harmed by 
the overbroad term or practice, the court will not be faced with the strange 
situation of penalizing an otherwise righteous plaintiff and rewarding an 
otherwise infringing defendant. While this change seems to abandon the 
doctrine of unclean hands, it really only serves to focus the court’s review on the 
specific controversy before it. A plaintiff’s terms or practices that constitute 
copyright misuse would only become relevant if they are applicable to the case 
at hand. If they apply, the plaintiff can then rightfully be deemed to have entered 
the court with unclean hands. If not, the terms or practices should be considered 
moot. This doctrinal change would protect copyright holders who seek to 
legitimately enforce their rights and allow courts to focus solely on the facts 
presented. 
Next, when courts are presented with a licensing agreement that contains 
a violative term, courts should have the ability to sever that copyright term from 
the agreement. For example, in MDY, Blizzard Entertainment revised its end-
user license agreement to include the use of second-generation bots under 
behavior it classified as copyright infringement:113 
The license granted to you in Section 1 is subject to the limitations set 
forth in Sections 1 and 2 (collectively, the “License Limitations”). Any use 
of the Game in violation of the License Limitations will be regarded as an 
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infringement of Blizzard’s copyrights in and to the Game. You agree that 
you will not, under any circumstances . . . use cheats, automation software 
(bots), hacks, mods or any other unauthorized second-generation software 
designed to modify the World of Warcraft experience.114 
The court in this case engaged in a highly technical and time-consuming 
analysis of contract law in order to find that Blizzard’s customers were not 
actually copyright infringers.115 It would have been much more efficient for the 
court to simply look at this particular term, find that it was overbroad in its 
attempt to protect Blizzard’s copyright, and strike it from the end-user license 
agreement. Striking the offensive term on grounds that it constitutes copyright 
misuse would leave the remainder of the copyright protections enforceable and 
allow legitimate second-generation developers the ability to continue to innovate 
and compete. Once the term or practice has been declared invalid, the court can 
then analyze the facts before it to determine whether infringement has occurred. 
This solution will allow courts to conduct a misuse analysis without being faced 
with the prospect of rendering a large content provider’s copyright entirely 
unenforceable. 
In sum, this solution would ultimately protect the interests of both 
plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs would be free to litigate against accused 
infringers without fearing the loss of all copyright protection, and defendants 
would be assured an affirmative copyright misuse defense provided they can 
prove actual harm resulted from that misuse. 
B. Advantages of a Narrowed Approach to Copyright Misuse 
The advent of online communities, products, and services has given rise 
to the belief that developers have an absolute right to control every aspect of the 
new world, or “walled garden,” that they have created.116 After all, copyright law 
considers software a literary expression,117 and so it seems instinctively fair that 
the right to control upgrades and additions belongs to the original creator under 
a derivative works right. 
However, this is an overly simplistic view. Courts have long 
acknowledged that aspects of software are purely functional,118and that 
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functional copyrights are typically thin.119 The addition of anti-circumvention 
provisions provide courts with a tempting, but ultimately damaging, shortcut by 
allowing them to simply find infringement of this new absolute right instead of 
performing the misuse analysis. 
A review of the past fifteen years has shown that the DMCA 
circumvention protections have helped copyright holders protect their digital 
content from piracy, but they have also enabled copyright holders to expand the 
scope of the protections to include non-copyrightable materials.120 These 
holdings have unintentionally encouraged abuse by allowing copyright holders 
to corner their respective aftermarkets by allowing them to build a walled garden 
where they can develop enhancements exclusively and at their own pace.121 
Courts have a responsibility to make sure that the public interest is served 
by removing unfair impediments to competition, even in difficult technical 
cases. By narrowing the scope of misuse, courts should be more willing to find 
in favor of defendants who adequately plead the affirmative defense. Allowing 
this defense prevents copyright holders from abusing their anti-circumvention 
rights, which ultimately benefits the public by way of additional competition and 
a wider variety of available products and services. 
Courts can also provide a certain amount of predictability for innovators 
who seek to enter the software aftermarket. By narrowing the misuse defense, a 
finding in favor of defendants would avoid destruction of all of the plaintiffs’ 
copyright protections. Not only would a narrowed misuse defense protect 
plaintiffs’ from harsh penalties, it would simultaneously acknowledge that new 
innovators also occupy a legitimate space in the market. As a result, copyright 
law would encourage second-generation innovators to enter the software 
aftermarket and would avoid forcing these innovators to take drastic measures 
such as moving their businesses overseas. 
Additionally, recognizing misuse would ultimately result in fewer 
lawsuits. Once the courts apply the narrowed standard in a few cases and 
establish a solid precedent, the law will become clear to copyright holders and 
second-generation innovators alike. A clear precedent will act as a guide to 
potential plaintiffs looking to file suit and simultaneously discourage them from 
filing meritless DMCA complaints. 
Finally, these improvements rebalance the shift in power between 
copyright holders and second-generation innovators—a shift that has occurred 
since the passage of the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions. As Dan Burk 
predicted, large corporate copyright holders like Blizzard, Craigslist, and 
Facebook have been able to protect portions of the intangible market that, had 
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they existed in the physical world, would likely not have been protected under 
copyright law.122 Courts will serve the public interest by encouraging software 
improvements if they permit second-generation developers to assert copyright 
misuse when these developers circumvented access controls, not to copy, but to 
provide additional supporting programs that complement an existing application. 
When additional programmers are encouraged to participate in the market, more 
programs are created, thereby creating a greater selection of online products and 
services. Additionally, more minds working on problems contribute to the 
“Progress of Science” as the founders intended.123 
III. A NARROWED VERSION OF COPYRIGHT MISUSE STRIKES THE 
RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN RELUCTANT COURTS AND COPYRIGHT 
ABUSERS 
Although approaches and reactions to the misuse doctrine have varied 
greatly over the last twenty-five years, courts must recognize the copyright 
misuse defense in order to restore a proper balance to copyright law in the 
digital age. 
Critics like Megan Dolan have suggested that copyright misuse is an 
inappropriate affirmative defense. In her article Misusing Misuse, Dolan points 
out that misuse is a common law doctrine never codified or sanctioned by 
Congress.124 Without this recognition by Congress, she argues that courts should 
not be allowed to apply a body of common law that is seemingly contrary to 
Congressional intent.125 
While it is true that copyright misuse is a common law doctrine, it has 
evolved because Congress did not adequately articulate its intent. Courts have 
varied widely in their opinions of how the language in §§ 1201(a) and (b) ought 
to be interpreted, resulting in a circuit split between the Federal and Ninth 
Circuits.126 Without clear guidance from Congress, courts are forced to rely on 
common law doctrine and public policy in order to interpret these provisions in 
good faith. 
Courts, therefore, must look to two centuries of copyright policy that has 
consistently required the protection of the rights of copyright holders. However, 
the Supreme Court has ruled that protection does not extend to ideas and 
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functionality.127 In this light, the Chamberlain court’s reasoning is persuasive in 
that the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions were not intended to cover 
subject matter or functionality not traditionally protected. 
Additionally, Dolan reasons that misuse should be rejected completely 
because it provides ill-advised economic incentives for copyright infringers.128 
However, her reasoning fails to consider the possibility of narrowing the 
defense, which would alleviate her concerns about incentives. Kathryn Judge 
has offered one proposal for making the doctrine more palatable to courts.129 She 
argues that upon a finding of misuse, the copyright should be suspended with the 
right to cure.130 In other words, if a defendant succeeds in his copyright misuse 
defense, the copyright holder is then given the opportunity to fix the misuse 
before proceeding with the infringement claims.131 The merits to such an 
approach are not insubstantial. This approach would have the practical effect of 
allowing a copyright holder to update its policies or offending practices before 
resuming its infringement suit in an attempt to attain damages. Infringers would 
also have notice that while their infringing activities might not be punishable at 
the moment, they could face suits after the copyright holder cures its bad 
practices. 
This approach might ease some of the apprehension courts have in 
finding misuse, but, ultimately, such an approach may add administrative burden 
and costs to all parties involved based on the second suit brought after misuse is 
cured. Although other approaches have some merit, adopting the narrowed 
approach to copyright misuse provides the best solution. It allows courts to act 
quickly to render overreaching terms invalid; thus, the narrowed approach 
provides relief that addresses only the harmful terms without invalidating or 
suspending protection to legitimate subject matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The time has come for the courts to recognize the next generation of 
copyright misuse. While the DMCA provides strong copyright protections 
against online piracy of digital content, these same protections are being 
exploited by copyright holders to lock out competition by barring access to 
material not traditionally protected by copyright.  
Courts, therefore, should adopt a narrow doctrine of copyright misuse that 
restricts the affirmative defense to defendants who can show they have been 
harmed by the misuse. Additionally, courts should have the flexibility to strike 
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terms or practices that copyright holders have adopted to unfairly protect ideas 
that would otherwise be available to second-generation developers. Adopting 
this modified form of misuse will recalibrate the balance of power between 
copyright holders and second-generation developers by allowing courts to 
minimize penalties on copyright holders when merited, while, at the same time, 
allowing second-generation developers access to the information needed to 
compete in emerging software aftermarkets. 
